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Abstract
We consider parametric examples of two-bidder private value auctions in which each bidder
observes her own private valuation as well as noisy signals about her opponent’s private valuation. In such multidimensional private value auction environments, we show that the revenue
equivalence between the first and second price auctions breaks down and there is no definite
revenue ranking; while the second price auction is always eﬃcient allocatively, the first price auction may be ineﬃcient and the ineﬃciency may increase as the signal becomes more informative;
equilibria may fail to exist for the first price auction. We also show that auction mechanisms
provide diﬀerent incentives for bidders to acquire costly information about opponents’ valuation.
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Introduction
The paradigm of symmetric independent private value (IPV) auctions assumes that each bid-

der’s valuation of an object is independently drawn from an identical distribution (Myerson 1981,
Riley and Samuelson 1981). Each bidder observes her own valuation, and has no information about
her opponent’s valuation except for the distribution from which it is drawn. An important implication of this assumption is that each bidder’s belief about her opponent’s valuation is independent
of her own valuation and thus it is common knowledge.
In actual auctions, it is probable that bidders may have, or may have incentives to acquire,
information about their opponents’ valuations. Moreover, such information may often be noisy and
privately observed. This point can be made for both private and common value auction environments. For example, timber firms in the U.S. Forest Service timber auctions can cruise the tract
being auctioned and form estimates of its characteristics (Baldwin, Marshall and Richard 1997).
It is possible that a timber firm can obtain some noisy information about its opponents’ estimates
via insider rumors and industrial espionage. In highway construction procurement auctions, the
capacity constraints of the bidders are an important determinant of their costs (Jofre-Bonet and
Pesendorfer 2002). Even when the actual cost of a firm, say firm A, is its private information, other
firms may still obtain signals of A’s cost based on their noisy observations of how much firm A’s
capacity is stretched. Importantly, each bidder is aware that her opponents may have some signals
about her valuation or cost, but does not actually know the signals observed by her opponents.
In this paper, we assume that bidders have noisy information about opponents’ valuations and
explore its consequences under the first-price (FPA) and second-price (SPA) auction mechanisms.
Specifically, we consider parametric examples of two-bidder private value auctions in which each
bidder’s private valuation of the object is independently drawn from an identical distribution,
and each bidder observes a noisy signal about her opponent’s valuation. Thus, each bidder has
a two-dimensional type that include her own valuation (the valuation type) and the signal about
her opponent’s valuation (the information type). A bidder’s information about her opponents’
valuation is not known by her opponent. In such a multidimensional auction environment, we
show the following results. First, revenue equivalence of standard one-dimensional symmetric IPV
auctions breaks down. However, our examples demonstrate that there is no general revenue ranking
between the FPA and the SPA. Second, the equilibrium allocation of the object could be ineﬃcient
in the FPA but is always eﬃcient in the SPA. Moreover, the revenue and allocative eﬃciency may
not coincide: on the one hand, an ineﬃcient FPA may generate a higher expected revenue for the
seller; on the other hand, the seller’s expected revenue could be higher in the SPA even when the
object is eﬃciently allocated in both auctions. The ineﬃciency in the FPA will typically be non1

monotonic in the accuracy of information, since with either complete information or no information,
eﬃciency is obtained in the first price auctions. Third, while the SPA always admits equilibrium
in weakly dominant strategies, the FPA may not have any equilibrium. Finally, we illustrate that
diﬀerent auction mechanisms provide diﬀerent incentives for bidders to acquire costly information
about opponents’ private valuations. We illustrate all these results in simple examples that we can
solve explicitly. However, we also argue in each case why the key features of the examples should
be expected to occur more generally.
Our examples add to the list of departures from the standard symmetric IPV auction environments in which the revenue equivalence between the first and second-price auctions fails. Maskin
and Riley (2000a) consider private value auctions in which bidders are ex ante asymmetric in the
sense that diﬀerent bidders’ valuations are drawn from diﬀerent distributions. They show that
the revenue ranking between the first and the second-price auctions is ambiguous even though
the SPA is at least as eﬃcient as the FPA (see also Arozamena and Cantillon 2002 and Cantillon
2003). In their model, bidders’ types are one dimensional and the asymmetry among bidders is
common knowledge. Holt (1980) and Matthews (1987) show that, when bidders are symmetrically
risk averse, the seller’s expected revenue in the FPA is higher than that in the SPA. Che and
Gale (1998) compare the standard auctions with financially constrained bidders, and show that the
seller’s expected revenue in the FPA is higher than that in the SPA. The bidders in their paper are
privately informed of both their valuation of the object and their financial capacity, and thus have
multidimensional types. However, both the bidders’ valuation and financial capacity are assumed
to be independently drawn from identical distributions, hence the common knowledge assumption
is maintained. This paper is related to the aﬃliated value framework of Wilson (1977) and Milgrom
and Weber (1985) in which they showed that when bidders’ valuations are aﬃliated, the seller’s
expected revenue is higher in the SPA than in the FPA (more generally, the so-called “linkage
principle”). The main diﬀerence between the auction environment studied in this paper and the
aﬃliated private value (APV) model is as follows: in the APV model, bidder i0 s belief about j 0 s
valuation depends on i0 s own private valuation, but does not depend on j 0 s actual valuation; while
in our model, bidder j 0 s private valuation influences bidder i0 s belief about j 0 s valuation through
a noisy signal. In other words, in the APV model bidders’ types are one-dimensional (i.e., a bidder’s valuation type and her information type coincide), and as a result the standard auctions
are all eﬃcient in the APV model despite their revenue ranking. A closely related paper is Kim
and Che (2002) which considers private value auction environments in which subgroups of bidders
may perfectly observe the valuations of others within the group but have no information about
bidders outside of the subgroup. They show that the seller’s expected revenue is higher in the SPA
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than that in the FPA and the FPA is allocatively ineﬃcient with positive probability. While their
model is more general, our paper is diﬀerent from theirs in assuming that bidders’ signals about
opponents’ valuations are noisy and private. Che and Gale (2002) propose a general methodology
for comparing the seller’s expected revenues from diﬀerent auction mechanisms in environments
where bidders have multidimensional types. But they assume that bidders’ types are drawn from
independent distributions.
We restrict the seller to two possible mechanisms for allocating the object: first and second price
auctions. With more general mechanisms, in our setting, sellers could fully extract the surplus,
exploiting the correlation between bidders’ multidimensional types, using the type of argument
employed in Cremer and McLean (1985).1 Such mechanisms rely on very strong common knowledge
assumptions among the seller and the bidders and would not work on more realistic type spaces (see
Neeman 2001 and Bergemann and Morris 2003). For this reason, we restrict attention to simple
mechanisms. Our work is an attempt to make a first step at relaxing the standard (but unfortunate)
assumption in auction theory of identifying players’ beliefs with their payoﬀ types.2 An alternative
way of allowing richer beliefs into standard independent private value auctions is to introduce
strategic uncertainty by relaxing the solution concept from equilibrium to rationalizability. This
avenue has been pursued by Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2000) and Dekel and Wolinsky (2003),
for first price auctions, while maintaining the assumption of no private information about others’
values.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the parametric auction
environment we examine; Section 3 shows the revenue non-equivalence between the first and secondprice auctions in our auction environment; Section 4 shows the possible ineﬃciency of the FPA;
Section 5 shows that there may exist no equilibrium in the FPA; Section 6 provides examples
that reverse the revenue ranking between the FPA and the SPA and illustrate the incentives of
information acquisition under diﬀerent auction mechanisms; and Section 7 concludes.
1

The literature on general mechanisms with multidimensional types focusses on eﬃciency questions. Jehiel and

Moldovanu (2001) show that, generically, there are no eﬃcient auction mechanisms when bidders have independent
multidimensional signals and interdependent valuations. McLean and Postlewaite (2003) study situations in which
bidders’ valuations consist of both common and idiosyncratic components. Bidders privately observe their idiosyncratic component of the valuation, and some signal regarding the common component. They show that a modification
of the Vickrey auction is eﬃcient under quite general conditions in their settings.
2

See Feinberg and Skrypacz (2002) pursue the same relaxation in the context of models of bargaining under

incomplete information.

3
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The Model
Two bidders, i = 1, 2, compete for an object. Bidders’ valuations of the object are private

and independently drawn from identical distributions. We assume that bidders’ valuation of the
object takes on three possible values {Vl , Vm , Vh } where Vl < Vm < Vh .3 The ex ante probability of

bidder i0 s valuation vi taking on value Vk is denoted by pk ∈ [0, 1) where k ∈ {l, m, h} . Of course
P
k∈{l,m,h} pk = 1. To ease exposition, we will refer to bidder 1 as “she” and bidder 2 as “he”, and

refer to a generic bidder as “she” when no confusion shall arise.

As in standard private value auction models, bidder i observes her private valuation vi ∈

{Vl , Vm , Vh } . The novel feature of this paper is as follows: we assume that each bidder also observes

a noisy signal about her opponent’s valuation. For tractability, we assume that the noisy signal
takes on two possible qualitative categories {L, H} . Bidder i0 s signal si ∈ {L, H} about j 0 s valuation

vj is generated as follows. For k ∈ {l, m, h} , and i, j ∈ {1, 2} , i 6= j,
Pr (si = L|vj = Vk ) = qk ,

Pr (si = H|vj = Vk ) = 1 − qk ,

(1)

where qk ∈ [0, 1] . We assume that ql ≥ qm ≥ qh . Note that when ql = qm = qh , the signals

are completely uninformative about the opponent’s valuation.4 We assume that bidders’ signals

s1 and s2 are independent. To summarize, each bidder has a two-dimensional type (vi , si ) ∈

{Vl , Vm , Vh } × {L, H} where vi is called bidder i0 s valuation type and si her information type.
To summarize, the primitives of our model are a tuple of nine parameters as follows:
)
(
X
pk = 1, qk ∈ [0, 1] .
E = hVk , pk , qk ik∈{l,m,h} : Vl < Vm < Vh , pk ∈ [0, 1] ,
k

Any element e ∈ E is called an auction environment.

We first compare the seller’s expected revenue and the allocative eﬃciency of the standard

auctions. Since we are in a two-person private value environment, Dutch and English auctions are
strategically equivalent to the FPA and the SPA, respectively. Thus we will only analyze the FPA
and the SPA: Bidders simultaneously submit bids; the high bidder wins the object. In the event
of a tie, we assume that the bidder with higher valuation wins the object if the bidders’ valuations
are diﬀerent; and the tie-breaking can be arbitrary if the bidders’ valuations are the same.5
3

Wang (1991) and Campbell and Levin (2000) studied common value auctions with discrete valuations.

4

Because completely uninformative signals are the same as no signals at all, this special case corresponds to the

standard one-dimensional IPV model.
5

It is well known now that tie-breaking rules are important in guaranteeing equilibrium existence in first-price

auctions. Notice that this tie-breaking rule is endogenous. Kim and Che (2002) and Maskin and Riley (2000b) used
a similar assumption.
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As usual, we will analyze the auctions as a Bayesian game of incomplete information between
two bidders in which the type space for each bidder is T ≡ {Vl , Vm , Vh } × {L, H} . Bidder i0 s generic
type is ti = (vi , si ) ∈ T. Given her information type si , bidder i updates her belief about j 0 s

valuation type vj according to Bayes rule as follows. For si ∈ {L, H} , and k ∈ {l, m, h},
Pr (vj = Vk |si = L) = P

pk qk

k0 ∈{l,m,h} pk0 qk0

,

pk (1 − qk )
. (2)
k0 ∈{l,m,h} pk0 (1 − qk0 )

Pr (vj = Vk |si = H) = P

Analogously, given her valuation type vi , bidder i updates her belief about j 0 s information type sj
according to the signal technology specified by (1). For any (t1 , t2 ) = ((v1 , s1 ) , (v2 , s2 )) ∈ T 2 , the
joint probability mass is

Pr (t1 , t2 ) = Pr (v1 ) Pr (s1 |v2 ) × Pr (v2 ) Pr (s2 |v1 ) ,
and the conditional probability is
Pr (ti |tj ) = Pr (vi |sj ) Pr (si |vj ) where i 6= j.

3

(3)

Seller’s Expected Revenue
We first show that the celebrated revenue equivalence result for the standard one-dimensional

IPV auctions breaks down in our multidimensional setting. To demonstrate this result in the
simplest possible fashion, we consider a special case of the above model:
• pm = 0, pl ∈ (0, 1) , ph ∈ (0, 1) . That is, the bidders’ valuations are only of two possible types,
{Vl , Vh } .

• ql = 1 − qh = q ∈ [1/2, 1] . That is, signal L is equally indicative of value Vl as signal H is
of value Vh . The parameter q measures the accuracy of the signal: when q = 1/2, the signals

are completely uninformative; and when q = 1, the signals are perfectly informative.

3.1

Second-Price Auction

In the SPA, it is routine to show that the unique equilibrium in weakly dominant strategies in
this multidimensional setting is for a bidder of type (vi , si ) to bid her private value vi regardless of
her information type. That is, the equilibrium bidding strategy of bidder i in the SPA, denoted by
BiSPA , is:
BiSPA (vi , si ) = vi for i = 1, 2, and (vi , si ) ∈ {Vl , Vh } × {L, H} .
5

(4)

In fact, this equilibrium characterization for the SPA is completely general to any private value
auction environment and does not depend on the number of bidders, discrete valuation and signal
types. We thus conclude that the multidimensional SPA is eﬃcient; and the seller’s expected
revenue is independent of accuracy of the signals, hence equal to that in the standard environment
where bidders only observe their own valuations.

3.2

First-Price Auction

Now we analyze the equilibrium of the first-price auction. We will proceed via some intermediate
lemmas and summarize the characterization of the equilibrium of the FPA in Proposition 1.
Lemma 1 In any equilibrium of the FPA, type-(Vl , s) bidders bid Vl in pure strategies for s ∈

{L, H} . That is, for i = 1, 2,

BiFPA (Vl , s) = Vl for s ∈ {L, H} .
Proof. We first argue that bidders with valuation Vl must bid in pure strategies in equilibrium.
£ ¤
Suppose that type-(Vl , H) bidders plays a mixed strategy equilibrium on support b, b̄ with b < b̄.

(The lower limit of the interval may be open, but this is not important for the argument.) Clearly
¡
¢
b̄ ≤ Vl . Since the bid b + b̄ /2 wins positive probability, it yields a positive surplus for type-(Vl , H)

bidder. However, bids close to b will win with probability almost zero, hence the expected surplus

will approach zero. A contradiction for the indiﬀerence condition required for the mixed strategy.
Hence type-(Vl , H) bidders must bid in pure strategies. Identical arguments show that type-(Vl , L)
bidders must also bid in pure strategy. Now we argue that, if type-(Vl , L) and (Vl , H) bidders must
bid their valuation Vl in pure strategy. To see this, suppose that type-(Vl , L) and (Vl , H) bidder 2
bids less than Vl . Then bidder 1 of these types can deviate by bidding ε more than bidder 2, which
will be a profitable deviation if ε is made arbitrarily close to zero. A contradiction.
Next we show that the following mixed strategies for type-(Vh , L) and (Vh , H) bidders constitute
a symmetric equilibrium. We will later argue that this is the unique equilibrium of the FPA.
Lemma 2 Together with the strategies specified in Lemma 1 for bidders with valuation Vl , the
following constitute a symmetric equilibrium:
¤
£
1. Type-(Vh , L) bidders play a mixed strategy on Vl , b̄(Vh ,L) according to CDF G(Vh ,L) (·) given
by

G(Vh ,L) (b) =

pl q (b − Vl )
,
ph (1 − q)2 (Vh − b)

6

(5)

where

ph (1 − q)2 Vh + pl qVl
;
(6)
ph (1 − q)2 + pl q
£
¤
2. Type-(Vh , H) bidders play a mixed strategy on b̄(Vh ,L) , b̄(Vh ,H) according to CDF G(Vh ,H) (·)
b̄(Vh ,L) =

given by

where

¡
¢
(pl + ph q) (1 − q) b − b̄(Vh ,L)
,
G(Vh ,H) (b) =
ph q 2 (Vh − b)

(7)

ph q2 Vh + (pl + ph q) (1 − q) b̄(Vh ,L)
.
ph q2 + (pl + ph q) (1 − q)

(8)

b̄(Vh ,H) =

Proof. Suppose that bidder 2 bids according to the postulated strategies.
is

£
¤
First, consider type-(Vh , L) bidder 1. Her expected payoﬀ from submitting a bid b ∈ Vl , b̄(Vh ,L)
(Vh − b)

(

)
pl q
ph (1 − q)2
(b) ,
+
G
pl q + ph (1 − q) pl q + ph (1 − q) (Vh ,L)

(9)

where:
• the term pl q/ [pl q + ph (1 − q)] is the probability that bidder 2 has a valuation type Vl conditional on bidder 1’s own information type L [recall formula (2)]. By Lemma 1, bidder 2 with

valuation type Vl bids Vl with probability one. Thus bidder 1 wins with probability 1 against
¤
£
such an opponent with any bid in the interval Vl , b̄(Vh ,L) (note that the tie-breaking rule is
applied at the bid Vl );

• the term ph (1 − q)2 / [pl q + ph (1 − q)] is the probability that bidder 2 is of type (Vh , L) conditional on bidder 1’s own type (Vh , L) [recall formula (3)]. Since type-(Vh , L) bidder 2 is

postulated to bid in mixed strategies according to G(Vh ,L) (·) , bidder 1’s bid of b wins against
such an opponent with probability G(Vh ,L) (b) .
Plugging G(Vh ,L) (·) as described by (5) into (9) yields a positive constant, denoted by K(Vh ,L) , given
by
K(Vh ,L) =

pl q
(Vh − Vl ) ,
ph (1 − q) + pl q

(10)

which is type-(Vh , L) bidder’s expected surplus. Therefore type-(Vh , L) bidder 1 indeed is indiﬀerent
¤
£
between any bids in the interval Vl , b̄(Vh ,L) provided that bidder 2 follows the postulated strategy.
Now we check that type-(Vh , L) bidder 1 does not have incentive to deviate to other bids. First,

she clearly does not have incentive to deviate to bids lower than or equal to Vl , since it would
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have yielded her a zero surplus instead of a positive K(Vh ,L) . Now suppose that she deviates to
b̄(Vh ,L) < b ≤ b̄(Vh ,H) , her expected payoﬀ would be
(
)
pl q
ph (1 − q)2
ph (1 − q) q
+
+
G
(b)
(Vh − b)
pl q + ph (1 − q) pl q + ph (1 − q) pl q + ph (1 − q) (Vh ,H)

(11)

where the term ph (1 − q) q/ [ph (1 − q) + pl q] the probability that bidder 2 is of type (Vh , H)

conditional on bidder 1’s own type (Vh , L) ; and G(Vh ,H) (b) is the probability that a bid b ∈
¡
¤
b̄(Vh ,L) , b̄(Vh ,H) wins against such an opponent. Plugging G(Vh ,H) (·) as described by (7) into

(11), we obtain

=

¡
¢
pl q + ph (1 − q)2
ph (1 − q) q (pl + ph q) (1 − q) b − b̄(Vh ,L)
(Vh − b) +
pl q + ph (1 − q)
pl q + ph (1 − q)
ph q 2
nh
i
o
h
i
pl q + ph (1 − q)2 Vh − (pl + ph q) (1 − q)2 b̄(Vh ,L) + pl (1 − q)2 − q 2 b/q
pl q + ph (1 − q)

which is non-increasing in b since q ≥ 1/2. Hence type-(Vh , L) bidder 1 does not have incentive to
¤
¡
deviate to bids in the interval b̄(Vh ,L) , b̄(Vh ,H) ; which also implies that her expected payoﬀ would
be even smaller if she bids more than b̄(Vh ,H) .

Now consider type-(Vh , H) bidder 1. Given that bidder 2 plays according to the postulated
¤
£
strategies, her expected payoﬀ from bidding b ∈ b̄(Vh ,L) , b̄(Vh ,H) is given by
(VH − b)
where:

½

¾
ph q (1 − q)
ph q 2
pl (1 − q)
+
+
G
(b) ,
ph q + pl (1 − q) ph q + pl (1 − q) ph q + pl (1 − q) (Vh ,H)

(12)

• the term pl (1 − q) / [ph q + pl (1 − q)] is the probability that bidder 2 has valuation Vl conditional on bidder 1’s signal H; and the term [ph q (1 − q)] / [ph q + pl (1 − q)] is the probability
£
¤
that bidder 2 is of type (Vh , L). In both events, a bid b ∈ b̄(Vh ,L) , b̄(Vh ,H) wins against such

opponents with probability one under the postulated strategies by bidder 2;

• the term ph q 2 / [ph q + pl (1 − q)] is probability that bidder 2 is of type (Vh , H) conditional on
¤
£
bidder 1’s own type (Vh , H) . In this case, a bid b ∈ b̄(Vh ,L) , b̄(Vh ,H) wins with probability
G(Vh ,H) (b) .

Plugging G(Vh ,H) (·) as described by (7) into (12), we obtain a positive constant, denoted by K(Vh ,H) ,
given by
K(Vh ,H) =

¢
(pl + ph q) (1 − q) ¡
Vh − b̄(Vh ,L) .
ph q + pl (1 − q)
8

(13)

¤
£
Hence type-(Vh , H) bidder 1 is indeed indiﬀerent between any bids in the interval b̄(Vh ,L) , b̄(Vh ,H) .
Now we check that type-(Vh , H) bidder 1 does not have incentive to deviate to other bids. First,

she does not have incentive to bid more than b̄(Vh ,H) , since bidding b̄(Vh ,H) strictly dominates any
higher bid given bidder 20 s strategies; second, she does not have incentive to bid less than or equal
to Vl since such bids will yield a zero surplus. Now we show that she does not have incentive to
¢
¡
¢
¡
bid in the interval Vl , b̄(Vh ,L) . Her expected payoﬀ from a bid b ∈ Vl , b̄(Vh ,L) is given by
½
¾
pl (1 − q)
ph q (1 − q)
(Vh − b)
(b)
(14)
+
G
ph q + pl (1 − q) ph q + pl (1 − q) (Vh ,L)
since such a bid loses to type-(Vh , H) opponent with probability one and win against a type-(Vh , L)
opponent with probability G(Vh ,L) (b) . Plugging G (Vh ,L ) (·) as described by (5) into (14), we get

=

pl (1 − q)
ph q (1 − q) pl q (b − Vl )
(Vh − b) +
ph q + pl (1 − q)
ph q + pl (1 − q) ph (1 − q)2
i
h
i
h
pl (1 − q)2 Vh − pl q 2 Vl + pl q2 − (1 − q)2 b
,
[ph q + pl (1 − q)] (1 − q)

which is non-decreasing in b since q ≥ 1/2. Hence type-(Vh , H) bidder 1 does not have incentive to
¢
¡
deviate to bids in the interval Vl , b̄(Vh ,L) .
¡
¢
Finally, note that the expressions for b̄(Vh ,L) and b̄(Vh ,H) respectively satisfy G(Vh ,L) b̄(Vh ,L) = 1
¡
¢
and G(Vh ,H) b̄(Vh ,H) = 1. This concludes the proof that the postulated bidding strategies constitute
a symmetric equilibrium.

Now we show that the FPA admits no other symmetric equilibrium.
Lemma 3 The symmetric equilibrium described in Lemma 2 is the unique symmetric equilibrium
of the FPA.
Proof. The argument proceeds in three steps.
Step 1. We show that in any symmetric equilibrium type-(Vh , L) and type-(Vh , H) bidders
must bid in mixed strategies. For example, suppose to the contrary that, say, a type-(Vh , L) bidder
2 bids in pure strategy an amount b̃ < Vh , then type-(Vh , L) bidder 1 can profitably deviate by
bidding b̃ + ε where ε > 0 is arbitrarily small. Such a deviation will provide a discrete positive
jump in type-(Vh , L) bidder 1’s probability of winning, hence it is profitable. The argument for
type-(Vh , H) bidders is analogous.
Step 2. We show that in any symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium, the supports of G(Vh ,L) (·)
and G(Vh ,H) (·) are contiguous and non-overlapping. That the supports should be contiguous follows
from the same ε-deviation argument as the one to rule out pure strategies. Now suppose that the
9

supports of G(Vh ,L) (·) and G(Vh ,H) (·) overlap in an interval [b1 , b2 ] with b2 > b1 . To be consistent
with mixed strategies, it must be the case that, the expected surplus for both types from any bid
b ∈ [b1 , b2 ] is constant. That is, for some constants K̃(Vh ,L) and K̃(Vh ,H) ,
)
(
ph q 2 G(Vh ,H) (b) ph q (1 − q) G(Vh ,L) (b)
pl (1 − q)
+
+
= K̃(Vh ,H) ,(15)
(Vh − b)
ph q + pl (1 − q) ph q + pl (1 − q)
ph q + pl (1 − q)
)
(
ph (1 − q) qG(Vh ,H) (b) ph (1 − q)2 G(Vh ,L) (b)
pl q
+
+
= K̃(Vh ,L) .(16)
(Vh − b)
ph (1 − q) + pl q
ph (1 − q) + pl q
ph (1 − q) + pl q
Multiplying Eq. (15) by (1 − q) [ph q + pl (1 − q)], and Eq. (16) by q [ph (1 − q) + pl q] , and summing
up, we obtain:

h
i
K̃(Vh ,H) (1 − q) [ph q + pl (1 − q)] − K̃(Vh ,L) q [ph (1 − q) + pl q] = (Vh − b) pl (1 − q)2 − q 2 .

(17)

Because the left hand side of Eq. (17) is a constant, this equation holds only for a single value
of b unless q = 1/2. Therefore , the supports of the symmetric equilibrium mixed strategies of
type-(Vh , L) and (Vh , H) bidders must be non-overlapping. The same argument also shows that the
supports of the symmetric equilibrium mixed strategies of type-(Vh , L) and type-(Vh , H) bidders
can not overlap at more than one point.
Step 3. We show that the support of type-(Vh , L) bidders’ mixed strategy must be lower than
h
i
that of type-(Vh , H) bidders. Suppose to the contrary. Let Vl , b̃ be the support of type-(Vh , H)
h i
bidder and b̃, b̂ be the support of type-(Vh , L) bidder, for some b̂ > b̃. For type-(Vh , L) bidders to
h i
randomize on b̃, b̂ , it must be the case that
(Vh − b)
=

(

)
pl q
ph (1 − q) q
ph (1 − q)2
(b)
+
+
G̃
ph (1 − q) + pl q ph (1 − q) + pl q ph (1 − q) + pl q (Vh ,L)

´ p q + p q (1 − q)
³
l
h
,
Vh − b̃
ph (1 − q) + pl q

from which, after solving for G̃(Vh ,L) (b) , we obtain
G̃(Vh ,L) (b) =

³
´
q (1 − ph q) b − b̃

.
(18)
ph (1 − q)2 (Vh − b)
h
i
h i
Suppose that type-(Vh , H) bidder 2 mixes over Vl , b̃ , and type-(Vh , L) bidder 2 mixes over b̃, b̂

according to G̃(Vh ,L) (·) as described by (18). Then the expected surplus for type-(Vh , H) bidder 1
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³ ´
from bidding b ∈ b̃, b̂ is given by
½

=

¾
pl (1 − q)
ph q 2
ph q (1 − q)
(b)
+
+
G̃
(Vh − b)
ph q + pl (1 − q) ph q + pl (1 − q) ph q + pl (1 − q) (Vh ,L)
h
i
¤
£
(1 − q) pl (1 − q) + ph q 2 Vh − q 2 (1 − ph q) b̃ + pl q 2 − (1 − q)2 b
(1 − q) [ph q + pl (1 − q)]

which is non-decreasing in b. Therefore, type-(Vh , H) bidder will have an incentive to bid higher
than b̃ if her opponent follows the prescribed strategies, a contradiction.
Combining Steps 1-3 and Lemma 1, we know that the equilibrium described in Lemma 2 is the
only symmetric equilibrium.
Lastly, we show that there is no asymmetric equilibrium.
Lemma 4 There is no asymmetric equilibrium.
Proof. First, arguments similar to step 3 in the proof of Lemma 3 can be used to show that in an
asymmetric equilibrium, the support of type-(Vh , L) bidders must be lower than that of type-(Vh , H)
bidders.
Now suppose that type-(Vh , L) bidder 1 and bidder 2 respectively play a mixed strategy on the
i
h
i
h
support Vl , b̃1 and Vl , b̃2 , and without loss of generality, suppose that b̃1 > b̃2 . Since type-(Vh , L)
bidder 1 must be indiﬀerent between any bids in (Vl , b̃2 ], type-(Vh , L) bidder 2’s mixed strategy,

denoted by G̃2(Vh ,L) , must satisfy
½
¾
ph (1 − q)
pl q
pl q
+
G̃2(Vh ,L) (b) = (Vh − Vl )
(Vh − b)
pl q + ph (1 − q) pl q + ph (1 − q)
pl q + ph (1 − q)
from which we obtain that b̃2 = b̄(Vh ,L) where b̄(Vh ,L) is specified by formula (6). Now since typei
h
(Vh , L) bidder 2 is indiﬀerent between any bids in Vl , b̃2 , type-(Vh , L) bidder 1’s mixed strategy
i
h
CDF, denoted by G̃1(Vh ,L) , in the interval Vl , b̃2 must satisfy
(Vh − b)

½

¾
pl q
pl q
ph (1 − q)
+
G̃1(Vh ,L) (b) = (Vh − Vl )
pl q + ph (1 − q) pl q + ph (1 − q)
pl q + ph (1 − q)

from which we obtain that
G̃1(Vh ,L) (b) =

pl q (b − Vl )
.
ph (1 − q)2 (Vh − b)

³ ´
¡
¢
But then G̃1(Vh ,L) b̃2 = G̃1(Vh ,L) b̄(Vh ,L) = 1. Hence b̃1 = b̃2 , a contradiction.
The following proposition summarizes Lemma 1-4:

11

Proposition 1 If pm = 0, ql = 1 − qh = q ∈ [1/2, 1] , then the unique equilibrium of the first-price

auction is symmetric and is described as follows: for i = 1, 2,
1. BiFPA (Vl , s) = Vl for s ∈ {L, H} ;

£
¤
2. Type-(Vh , L) bidder i mixes over Vl , b̄(Vh ,L) according to CDF G(Vh ,L) (·) specified by (5)
where b̄(Vh ,L) is given by (6);

£
¤
3. Type-(Vh , H) bidder i mixes over b̄(Vh ,L) , b̄(Vh ,H) according to CDF G(Vh ,H) (·) specified by
(7) where b̄(Vh ,H) is given by (8).

3.3

Revenue Non-Equivalence

Now we compare the seller’s expected revenue from the SPA and the FPA. Because bidders
bid their own private valuations in the SPA, the seller receives Vh if and only if both bidders have
valuation type Vh (an event that occurs with probability p2h ) and the seller receives Vl otherwise.
Hence the seller’s expected revenue from the SPA, denoted by RSPA , is
¡
¢
RSPA = 1 − p2h Vl + p2h Vh .

(19)

Since in the SPA a bidder obtains positive surplus (Vh − Vl ) only when her valuation is Vh and

her opponent’s valuation is Vl , an event that occurs with probability ph pl , each bidder’s ex ante

expected surplus from the SPA, denoted by M SPA , is
M SPA = ph pl (Vh − Vl ) ,

(20)

In the unique equilibrium of the FPA characterized in Proposition 1, the object is always
¡
¢
eﬃciently allocated. Thus, the expected social welfare is p2l Vl + 1 − p2l Vh . In equilibrium, bidders
with valuation type Vl obtains zero expected surplus; and type-(Vh , L) and type-(Vh , H) bidders

respectively obtain expected surplus K(Vh ,L) and K(Vh ,H) as described by (10) and (13). The ex
ante probabilities that bidder i is of type (Vh , L) and (Vh , H) are, respectively, Pr [ti = (Vh , L)] =
ph [ph (1 − q) + pl q] and Pr [ti = (Vh , H)] = ph [ph q + pl (1 − q)]. Thus, the ex ante expected surplus
of each bidder from the FPA, denoted by M FPA , is

M FPA (q) = Pr [ti = (Vh , L)] K(Vh ,L) + Pr [ti = (Vh , H)] K(Vh ,H)
ph q (1 − q) + pl q
=
ph pl (Vh − Vl ) .
ph (1 − q)2 + pl q
We have the following observations. First, M FPA depends on q and M SPA is independent of q. The
intuition is simply that bidders strategically use their information about opponent’s valuation only
12

in the FPA. Second, M FPA (q) > M SPA for all q ∈ (1/2, 1) and M FPA (1/2) = M FPA (1) = M SPA .

That is, a bidder’s expected surplus is strictly higher in the FPA than that in the SPA except for

the completely uninformative and completely informative signal cases. When q = 1/2, the signals
are completely uninformative, and bidders would simply disregard their information type. We can
see from Lemma 1 that the probability densities of G(Vh ,L) and G(Vh ,H) can be smoothly pasted at
b̄(Vh ,L) when q = 1/2, which implies that eﬀectively, when q = 1/2, bidders of valuation type Vh
¤
£
are simply playing a mixed strategy on the whole support of Vl , b̄(Vh ,H) . When q = 1, the FPA

becomes a complete information auction, and it is well known that it is revenue equivalent to the
SPA.
The seller’s expected revenue in the FPA, denoted by RFPA , is simply the diﬀerence between
the expected social welfare and the sum of the bidders’ expected surplus. That is,
¢ ¤
£ 2
¡
pl Vl + 1 − p2l Vh − 2M FPA (q)
¢
¡
2p2 pl (2q − 1) (1 − q)
= 1 − p2h Vl + p2h Vh − h
(Vh − Vl )
ph (1 − q)2 + pl q
2p2 pl (2q − 1) (1 − q)
= RSPA − h
(Vh − Vl ) .
ph (1 − q)2 + pl q

RFPA (q) =

(21)

The following proposition summarizes the comparison between RFPA (q) and RSPA :
Proposition 2 (Revenue Non-Equivalence) For any q ∈ (1/2, 1) , RFPA (q) < RSPA ; and

RFPA (1/2) = RFPA (1) = RSPA ; moreover, RFPA (q) has a unique minimizer.

That RFPA (q) has a unique minimizer in q follows from simple algebra. Figure 1 depicts the
seller’s expected revenues as a function of q ∈ [1/2, 1] from the two auction mechanisms for an

example where ph = 0.75, Vl = 0, Vh = 1.

Now we explain why the standard revenue equivalence theorem (see, for example, Mas-Colell
et. al., p. 890) breaks down in our multidimensional auction environment. An important condition
for the revenue equivalence theorem is that the equilibrium winning probability for every possible
bidder type must be equal in the two auction mechanisms. In our setting, however, this condition
is violated. For example, the probability of winning is the same bidder types (Vh , L) and (Vh , H)
in the SPA because both bid Vh in equilibrium. In the FPA, however, the probability of winning
is strictly higher for type-(Vh , H) bidder because, as characterized in Proposition 1, the support of
the equilibrium mixed strategy for type-(Vh , H) bidder is strictly higher than that of type-(Vh , L)
bidder.
We also note that in this two-valuation example (since pm = 0), the SPA generates a higher
expected seller revenue than the FPA despite the fact that both auction mechanisms are allocatively
13

SPA
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Figure 1: Seller’s expected revenues in the SPA and FPA: ph = 0.75, Vh = 1, Vl = 0.
eﬃcient. This is similar to the one-dimensional APV auctions: the objects are allocated eﬃciently
in both the first and second-price APV auctions, but the SPA generates higher expected revenue
for the seller (Milgrom and Weber 1982).

4

Eﬃciency
While the SPA is always allocatively eﬃcient in equilibrium, we argue in this section that the

allocative eﬃciency of the FPA in Section 3 is an artifact of the two-valuation example. When we
make all three valuations occur with positive probability, i.e., pk > 0 for k ∈ {l, m, h} , the unique

symmetric equilibrium of the FPA may be allocatively ineﬃcient. Allocative ineﬃciency may arise
in the FPA if a type-(Vm , H) bidder may infer that her opponent is mostly likely of valuation type
Vh and hence bid more aggressively than a type-(Vh , L) bidder, who perceives her opponent to be
weak and is willing to sacrifice the probability of winning to exchange for a bigger surplus when
winning against an opponent with valuation Vl . The subtle point is that this intuition works only
if the following conditions are met: (1) Type-(Vm , H) bidder’s posterior belief about her opponent
puts a small weight on (Vh , L) , and big weight on (Vh , H) . This requires that qm be suﬃciently
small and Pr (vj = Vh |si = H) be suﬃciently large; (2). Type-(Vh , L) bidder’s posterior belief about

her opponent puts a big weight on Vl . This requires that ql be suﬃciently large; (3). Vh can not be
too large relative to Vm since otherwise, type-(Vh , L) bidder is not willing to lower her probability

14

of winning by bidding conservatively.
Arguments similar to those in Section 3 can be used to establish that, first, in any symmetric
equilibrium of the FPA, bidders with valuation Vl must bid Vl in pure strategy regardless of their
information type; second, other types of bidders must bid in mixed strategies with contiguous and
non-overlapping supports; third, the support of type-(Vm , L) bidder’s mixed strategy must be lower
than that of type-(Vm , H); the support of type-(Vh , L) bidder’s mixed strategy must be lower than
that of type-(Vh , H) ; the support of type-(Vm , H) bidder’s mixed strategy must be lower than that
of type-(Vh , H), and the support of type-(Vm , L) bidder’s mixed strategy must be lower than that
of type-(Vh , L) . Thus the symmetric equilibrium of the FPA in this section takes only two possible
forms depending on the order of the mixed strategy supports of type-(Vm , H) and type-(Vh , L)
bidders. A symmetric equilibrium is eﬃcient if the equilibrium mixed strategy support of type(Vm , H) bidder is lower than that of type-(Vh , L) bidder; and it is ineﬃcient if the equilibrium
mixed strategy support of type-(Vh , L) bidder is lower than that of type-(Vm , H) bidder. We first
show the following result:
Proposition 3 (Eﬃcient and Ineﬃcient Equilibria Can not Coexist in the FPA) Any
auction environment e ∈ E can not simultaneously have both an eﬃcient and an ineﬃcient symmetric equilibrium in the FPA.

Proof. Suppose to the contrary that there is an auction environment that admits both types of
symmetric equilibrium in the FPA. First, since the support of type-(Vm , L) bidders must be lower
than those of type-(Vm , H) , (Vh , L) , and (Vh , H) bidders in both equilibria, the upper limit of
type-(Vm , L) bidders’ mixed strategies in both equilibria must be the same, which we denote by
b̄(Vm ,L) .
Let b̄eﬀ
(Vh ,L) be the upper limit of the mixed strategy support of type-(Vh , L) bidder in the eﬃcient
equilibrium and let b̄ineﬀ
(Vm ,H) be the upper limit of the mixed strategy support of type-(Vm , H) bidder
in the ineﬃcient equilibrium. We then consider two possible cases:
ineﬀ
Case 1: b̄eﬀ
(Vh ,L) ≥ b̄(Vm ,H) .

This case is illustrated in Figure 2. Since in the ineﬃcient
h
i
equilibrium type-(Vh , L) bidder is indiﬀerent between any bids in b̄(Vm ,L) , b̄ineﬀ
(Vh ,L) , her expected

surplus in the ineﬃcient equilibrium is the same as that when she bids b̄(Vm ,L) (recall our tie-breaking
rule), which is simply:
¡
¢
Z1 = Vh − b̄(Vm ,L)

(

pl ql

pm qm (1 − qh )
P
+P
k∈{l,m,h} pk qk
k∈{l,m,h} pk qk

)

,

(22)

where the term in the bracket is the expected probability of winning against bidders with Vl
valuation and type-(Vm , L) bidders. Given that her opponent follows the prescribed strategy in the
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Ineﬃcient Equilibrium
Vl

b(Vm ,L)

Vl

ineﬀ
b(Vh ,L)

ineﬀ
b(Vm ,H)

eﬀ
b(Vm ,H)

b(Vm ,L)

r

ineﬀ
b(Vh ,H)

Eﬃcient Equilibrium
eﬀ
b(Vh ,L)

eﬀ
b(Vh ,H)

Figure 2: Case 1 in the Proof of Proposition 3.

ineﬃcient equilibrium, her expected payoﬀ from deviating to a bid of b̄ineﬀ
(Vm ,H) is
´
³
Z2 = Vh − b̄ineﬀ
(Vm ,H)

(

pl ql

pm qm

ph qh (1 − qh )
P
+P
+P
k∈{l,m,h} pk qk
k∈{l,m,h} pk qk
k∈{l,m,h} pk qk

)

,

(23)

where the term in the bracket is the expected probability of winning against bidders with Vl and
Vm valuations and type-(Vh , L) bidders. By the requirement of the ineﬃcient equilibrium, we have
ineﬀ
Z1 > Z2 .6 Moreover, since in this case Vh > b̄eﬀ
(Vh ,L) ≥ b̄(Vm ,H) by assumption, we immediately have:

³

Z2 ≥ Vh − b̄eﬀ
(Vh ,L)

´

(

pl ql

pm qm

p q (1 − qh )
P
+P
+ Ph h
k∈{l,m,h} pk qk
k∈{l,m,h} pk qk
k∈{l,m,h} pk qk

)

(24)

But the right hand side of inequality (24) is exactly type-(Vh , L) bidder’s expected surplus in the
eﬃcient equilibrium, which by the definition of the eﬃcient equilibrium is required to be larger
than Z1 [as given by expression (22)]. This is so because Z1 is also type-(Vh , L) bidder’s expected
surplus from deviating to a bid of b̄(Vm ,L) in the eﬃcient equilibrium. Thus we have Z2 ≥ Z1 , which

is a contradiction to our earlier conclusion that Z1 > Z2 .
ineﬀ
Case 2: b̄eﬀ
(Vh ,L) < b̄(Vm ,H) .

A contradiction can be derived for type-(Vm , H) bidder using

arguments analogous to Case 1.
Our next result shows that, in contrast to the SPA, the FPA may be allocatively ineﬃcient.
Proposition 4 (Ineﬃciency of First-Price Auction) There exists an open set of auction
environments in E in which the unique symmetric equilibrium of the FPA is ineﬃcient.
6

The strict, rather than the usual weak, inequality, is valid because, tedious algebra shows that the deviation
£
¤
ineﬀ
surplus function is strictly decreasing in the whole interval b̄ineﬀ
(Vh ,L) , b̄(Vm ,H) in order to be consistent with the
ineﬃcient equilibrium.
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Proof. The proof of this Proposition is completely constructive, and we proceed by providing
an explicit auction environment with an ineﬃcient symmetric equilibrium. Proposition 3 then
guarantees that it does not admit any eﬃcient symmetric equilibrium. That there is an open set
of auction environments in E with ineﬃcient equilibrium in the FPA follows from continuity.
Consider an example of the model presented in Section 2 as follows:

• Vl = 0, Vm = 1 and Vh = 2. We can set Vl = 0 and Vm = 1 by normalization and scaling with

no loss of generality. For the ineﬃcient equilibrium described below to exist, Vh can not be
too high relative to Vm .

• pl = pm = ph = 1/3. That is, ex ante bidders’ valuations of the object take on the three

values with equal probability. This assumption is purely for computational ease in Bayesian
updating;

• ql = 0.9, qm = 0.1, qh = 0.05. As we described in the beginning of this section, the intuition
for ineﬃcient equilibrium requires that ql be big, qm to be small, and qh even smaller.

As in the example in Section 3, we know that bidders with valuation type Vl will bid Vl regardless
of their information types. Now we show that the following mixed strategies for the other types of
bidders constitute the unique symmetric equilibrium:
£
¤
• Type-(Vm , L) bidders bid according to a mixed strategy on the support Vl , b̄(Vm ,L) with CDF
G(Vm ,L) (·) where

2 V +q V
qm
m
l l
,
2
ql + qm
¶
µ
b − Vl
q
;
G(Vm ,L) (b) = 2l
qm Vm − b

b̄(Vm ,L) =

¤
£
• Type-(Vh , L) bidders bid according to a mixed strategy on the support b̄(Vm ,L) , b̄(Vh ,L) with
CDF G(Vh ,L) (·) where

b̄(Vh ,L) =
G(Vh ,L) (b) =

[ql + qm qh ] b̄(Vm ,L) + qh2 Vh
,
ql + qm qh + qh2
ql + qm qh b − b̄(Vm ,L)
;
Vh − b
qh2

¤
£
• Type-(Vm , H) bidders bid according to a mixed strategy on the support b̄(Vh ,L) , b̄(Vm ,H) with
17

CDF G(Vm ,H) (·) where
b̄(Vm ,H) =
G(Vm ,H) (b) =

[1 − ql + (1 − qm ) qm + (1 − qh ) qm ] b̄(Vh ,L) + (1 − qm )2 Vm

1 − ql + (1 − qm ) qm + (1 − qh ) qm + (1 − qm )2
1 − ql + (1 − qm ) qm + (1 − qh ) qm b − b̄(Vh ,L)
;
Vm − b
(1 − qm )2

,

¤
£
• Type-(Vh , H) bidders bid according to a mixed strategy on the support b̄(Vm ,H) , b̄(Vh ,H) with
CDF G(Vh ,H) (·) where

b̄(Vh ,H) =

i
h
(1 − qh )2 Vh + 3 − ql − qm − qh − (1 − qh )2 b̄(Vm ,H)

3 − ql − qm − qh
"
#
3 − ql − qm − qh − (1 − qh )2 b − b̄(Vm ,H)
G(Vh ,H) (b) =
.
Vh − b
(1 − qh )2

,

Under the above parameterization,
b̄(Vh ,H) ≈ 1.32531 > b̄(Vm ,H) ≈ 0.744012
> b̄(Vh ,L) ≈ 0.0164684 > b̄(Vm ,L) ≈ 0.010989 > Vl = 0.
To show that the above strategy profile constitutes an equilibrium, we need to demonstrate that,
given that the opponent follows the postulated strategies, each type-(v, s) bidder, where v ∈

{Vm , Vh } and s ∈ {L, H} , obtains a constant expected surplus from any bids in the support of

the CDF G(v,s) (·), which is in turn higher than the expected surplus from any other deviation bids.

The details of the verifications are straightforward but arithmetically tedious, thus relegated to
Appendix A. Figures 4-9 in Appendix A depict the expected surplus for each type of bidders from
diﬀerent bids, and it is clear that no type has incentive to deviate from the prescribed strategies.
Our model has an interesting implication regarding the impact of more information on eﬃciency. The probability of the object being ineﬃciently allocated in an ineﬃcient equilibrium is the
probability that the two bidders’ types are (Vm , H) and (Vh , L) respectively, which is given by
2 Pr {ti = (Vm , H) , tj = (Vh , L) , i 6= j}
= 2pm ph (1 − qh ) qm .
That is, the probability of ineﬃcient allocation in the FPA is increasing in 1 − qh locally in the set
of auction environments with ineﬃcient equilibrium. Recall that 1 − qh is the probability of bidder

i obtaining si = H when her opponent’s valuation vj = Vh . Thus the higher 1 − qh is, the more

informative the signal H is about Vh , and also of course, the more informative the signal L is about
Vl . Thus we have shown that:
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Corollary 1 The probability of ineﬃcient allocation may be increasing in the informativeness of
the signals.
Finally, it can also be verified that the seller’s expected revenue in the ineﬃcient equilibrium in
the FPA is again smaller than that in the SPA except for some knife-edge cases with measure zero.
The key observations of this section would clearly continue to hold in more general settings.
For example, suppose that bidders’ private values were independently drawn from a continuous
distribution and each bidder observed a continuous signal, correlated with the value of the other
bidder. In a continuous setting, eﬃciency would require that each bidder’s strategy depend only
on his valuation and not his signal. This would be impossible if the signal was informative. The
probability of ineﬃciency would therefore always be non-monotonic, since we have ineﬃciency with
intermediate informativeness of signals, but we have eﬃciency with either no information about
others’ values (eﬃciency is a well known property of the FPA with symmetric distributions and
independent private values) or full information about others’ values (there is eﬃciency in the FPA
with complete information).

5

Equilibrium Existence
Up to now, we have assumed that bidders’ information about the opponent’s private valuation

is of the same accuracy. In this section, we show that the existence of equilibrium in the FPA is contingent on this assumption in our model. For this purpose, we consider again the example we used
in Section 3, with the exception that the accuracy of bidder i0 s signal regarding bidder j 0 s valuation
is qi ∈ [1/2, 1) and we let q1 > q2 . Recall that qi = Pr (si = L|vj = Vl ) = Pr (si = H|vj = Vh ) . Our
main result in this section can be stated as follows.

Proposition 5 If pm = 0 and 1 ≥ q1 > q2 ≥ 1/2, then generically the FPA does not admit any
equilibrium.

Proof. Using standard ε-deviation arguments, we can show that (1). bidders with valuation Vl
must bid Vl in pure strategy in any equilibrium; (2). each bidder of type-(Vh , L) and type-(Vh , H)
must bid in mixed strategies with bids higher than Vl ; (3). the highest bid that may be submitted
by each bidder must be the same; (4). there is no gap in the bids submitted in equilibrium. We
denote the mixed strategy CDF of type-(Vh , L) and type-(Vh , H) bidder i by Gi(Vh ,L) and Gi(Vh ,H)
respectively, where i = 1, 2.
Next, we show that for each bidder i, the supports of Gi(Vh ,L) and Gi(Vh ,H) can not overlap at
more than one point. Without loss of generality, consider bidder 1. Let B1 be the set of points
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in which the supports of Gi(Vh ,L) and Gi(Vh ,H) overlap. For any overlap bid b ∈ B1 , the following

must be true:
¸
·
ph (1 − q1 ) (1 − q2 ) G2(Vh ,L) (b) ph (1 − q1 ) q2 G2(Vh ,H) (b)
pl q1
+
+
= K̃1(Vh ,L)
(Vh − b)
pl q1 + ph (1 − q1 )
pl q1 + ph (1 − q1 )
pl q1 + ph (1 − q1 )
¸
·
ph q1 (1 − q2 ) G2(Vh ,L) (b) ph q1 q2 G2(Vh ,H) (b)
pl (1 − q1 )
= K̃1(Vh ,H)
(Vh − b)
+
+
pl (1 − q1 ) + ph q1
pl (1 − q1 ) + ph q1
pl (1 − q1 ) + ph q1
Similar to the arguments in step 2 of the proof of Lemma 3, the above system equations can hold
for at most one value of b.
Therefore, we are left with four possible cases to consider depending on the order of the supports
of type-(Vh , L) and (Vh , H) mixed strategies for each bidder. We will derive a contradiction for one
of the cases, and the other cases can be dealt with analogously.

£
¤
We consider the following case: The support of Gi(Vh ,L) is Vl , b̄i(Vh ,L) and the support of

Gi(Vh ,H) is [b̄i(Vh ,L) , b̄i(Vh ,H) ]. From discussions above, b̄1(Vh ,H) = b̄2(Vh ,H) = b̄(Vh ,H) .

Step 1: Simple calculation shows that it must be the case that b̄1(Vh ,L) > b̄2(Vh ,L) .
Step 2: From the necessary indiﬀerence condition of type-(Vh , L) bidder 1 in the interval
£
¤
Vl , b̄2(Vh ,L) , we can obtain G2(Vh ,L) :
·
¸
ph (1 − q1 ) (1 − q2 ) G2(Vh ,L) (b)
pl q1
pl q1
+
= (Vh − Vl )
(Vh − b)
pl q1 + ph (1 − q1 )
pl q1 + ph (1 − q1 )
pl q1 + ph (1 − q1 )
pl q1
b − Vl
⇒ G2(Vh ,L) (b) =
ph (1 − q1 ) (1 − q2 ) Vh − b
ph (1 − q1 ) (1 − q2 ) Vh + pl q1 Vl
b̄2(Vh ,L) =
ph (1 − q1 ) (1 − q2 ) + pl q1
Step 3: The indiﬀerence condition for type-(Vh , L) bidder 2 requires that G1(Vh ,L) (b) must
¤
£
satisfy, for b ∈ Vl , b̄2(Vh ,L) ,
·
¸
ph (1 − q2 ) (1 − q1 ) G1(Vh ,L) (b)
pl q2
pl q2
+
= (Vh − Vl )
,
(Vh − b)
pl q2 + ph (1 − q2 )
pl q1 + ph (1 − q2 )
pl q2 + ph (1 − q2 )
from which we can obtain G1(Vh ,L) (b) for b ∈ (Vl , b̄2(Vh ,L) ] as
pl q2
b − Vl
.
ph (1 − q1 ) (1 − q2 ) Vh − b
£
¤
Step 4: To obtain the G1(Vh ,L) (b) for b ∈ b̄2(Vh ,L) , b̄1(Vh ,L) , we make use of the indiﬀerence
G1(Vh ,L) (b) =

condition of type-(Vh , H) bidder 2, which is given by
·
¸
pl (1 − q2 )
ph q2 (1 − q1 )
+
G1(Vh ,L) (b)
(Vh − b)
pl (1 − q2 ) + ph q2 pl (1 − q2 ) + ph q2
·
¸
¢
¡
¢
¡
ph q2 (1 − q1 )
pl (1 − q2 )
+
G
b̄
= Vh − b̄2(Vh ,L)
pl (1 − q2 ) + ph q2 pl (1 − q2 ) + ph q2 1(Vh ,L) 2(Vh ,L)
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¤
£
hence, for b ∈ b̄2(Vh ,L) , b̄1(Vh ,L)
¤
¡
¢£
¤
£
pl (1 − q2 ) b − b̄2(Vh ,L) + ph q2 (1 − q1 ) G1(Vh ,L) b̄2(Vh ,L) Vh − b̄2(Vh ,L)
.
G1(Vh ,L) (b) =
ph q2 (1 − q1 ) (Vh − b)
Setting G1(Vh ,L) (b) = 1, we obtain
¡
¢¤
¡
¢
ª
©£
1 − G1(Vh ,L) b̄2(Vh ,L) Vh + G1(Vh ,L) b̄2(Vh ,L) b̄2(Vh ,L) + pl (1 − q2 ) b̄2(Vh ,L)
b̄1(Vh ,L) =
ph q2 (1 − q1 ) + pl (1 − q2 )
¤
£
Step 5: The indiﬀerence condition of type-(Vh , L) bidder 1 for the bids in the interval b̄2(Vh ,L) , b̄1(Vh ,L)
¤
£
requires that G2(Vh ,H) (b) for b ∈ b̄2(Vh ,L) , b̄1(Vh ,L) must satisfy
ph q2 (1 − q1 )

·

pl q1
ph (1 − q1 ) (1 − q2 )
ph (1 − q1 ) q2
(Vh − b)
(b)
+
+
G
pl q1 + ph (1 − q1 )
pl q1 + ph (1 − q1 )
pl q1 + ph (1 − q1 ) 2(Vh ,H)
pl q1
= (Vh − Vl )
pl q1 + ph (1 − q1 )

¸

thus,
b − Vl
ph (1 − q1 ) (1 − q2 )
pl q1
−
Vh − b ph (1 − q1 ) q2
ph (1 − q1 ) q2
¡
¢
from which can obtain G2(Vh ,H) b̄1(Vh ,L) .
G2(Vh ,H) (b) =

Step 6: The indiﬀerence condition of type-(Vh , H) bidder 2 requires that G1(Vh ,H) (b) satisfy
·

¸
pl (1 − q2 )
ph q2 (1 − q1 )
ph q2 q1
+
+
G
(b)
(Vh − b)
pl (1 − q2 ) + ph q2 pl (1 − q2 ) + ph q2 pl (1 − q2 ) + ph q2 1(Vh ,H)
·
¸
¢
¡
¢
¡
ph q2 (1 − q1 )
pl (1 − q2 )
+
G
b̄
= Vh − b̄2(Vh ,L)
pl (1 − q2 ) + ph q2 pl (1 − q2 ) + ph q2 1(Vh ,L) 2(Vh ,L)

which implies a value for b̄1(Vh ,H) .

Step 7: Likewise, the indiﬀerence condition of type-(Vh , H) bidder 1 requires that G2(Vh ,H) (b)
¤
£
satisfy, for b ∈ b̄1(Vh ,L) , b̄2(Vh ,H) ,
·
¸
pl (1 − q1 )
ph q1
(Vh − b)
+
G
(b)
pl (1 − q1 ) + ph q1 pl (1 − q1 ) + ph q1 2(Vh ,H)
·
¸
¡
¢
¡
¢
pl (1 − q1 )
ph q1
= Vh − b̄1(Vh ,L)
+
G
b̄
pl (1 − q1 ) + ph q1 pl (1 − q1 ) + ph q1 2(Vh ,H) 1(Vh ,L)
which implies a value for b̄2(Vh ,H) .

Step 8: Generically, b̄1(Vh ,H) and b̄2(Vh ,H) are not equal, which contradicts the equilibrium
requirement by the standard ε-deviation argument. (see Figure 3 for a graphic illustration of the
above steps)
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Vl

b1(Vh ,L)

b1(Vh ,H)
Bidder 1

Bidder 2
Vl

b2(Vh ,L)

b2(Vh ,H)

Figure 3: A Graphic Illustration of the Proof of Proposition 5.

Examples of non-existence of equilibrium with multidimensional types are also presented in
Jackson (1999) in the context of auctions with both private and common value components, and
the example of this section has a similar flavor.
The non-existence problem is surely not an artifact of the discrete type assumption. Consider
again the case where bidders’ private values were independently drawn from a continuous distribution and each bidder observed a continuous signal, correlated with the value of the other bidder.
Even with strong assumptions of the signals (e.g., the monotone likelihood ratio property), if bidder
1 knows that bidder 2 is following a strategy that is monotonic in his valuation and his signal of
bidder 1’s valuation, bidder 1 will not have a best response that is monotonic (in the same sense).
To see why, suppose that bidder 1 has a bimodal distribution on bidder 2’s valuation, and thus
on bidder 2’s bid. Suppose that improvements in bidder 1’s signal translate up bidder 1’s beliefs
about bidder 2’s bids. For low values of the signal, it will be optimal for bidder 1 to bid such that
he wins against both modal bids. However, as his signal improves, there will be a point where he
will give up on winning against 2’s high modal bid and his bid will jump down to just above the
2’s low modal bid. Thus his bid will jump downwards as his signal improves. It is hard to think
of a primitive assumption on the signal structure that will prevent this type of non-monotonicity.
This monotonicity implies that the existence arguments such as those of Athey (2001) and Reny
and Zamir (2002) will not help in this problem.

6

Discussion: Revenue and Information Acquisition
In this section, we first present two examples of multidimensional private value auctions in

which the revenue ranking of the FPA and the SPA are reversed; and then discuss the incentives
of information acquisition.
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6.1

Revenue

We have observed that the SPA is eﬃcient and the FPA is not in general. This may suggest the
possibility that the SPA will generate more revenue (as suggested by the three valuation example
of section 4). We have also seen an example where the seller’s revenue in the SPA is higher than in
the FPA, even though the there is eﬃcient allocation of the object under both auctions (the two
valuation example in section 3). What can be said in general about the revenue ranking?
There is an easy way to see that a general revenue ranking is not possible. For some special
information structures, each bidder will know what private signal the other bidder has observed.
This will be true if each bidder observes a partition of the other bidder’s valuations. Now even
though we start with a model that is completely symmetric across bidders, conditional on the
observed signals, bidders are playing in an independent private values environment with asymmetric
distributions. But from the work of Maskin and Riley (2000), we already know that revenue ranking
may go either way. We can use this insight to construct the following example where revenue in
the FPA is higher than in the SPA. Presumably, this revenue ranking would continue to hold in
nearby models where private signals were not common knowledge among the players.
Example 1 Consider a private value auction with two bidders, i = 1, 2. Suppose that v1 and v2 are
independent and both drawn from Uniform [0, 1] . Bidders also observe a noisy signal about their
opponent’s valuation. Suppose that the signal is generated as follows: for i 6= j,
(
£
¤
L if vj ∈ 0, 12
si =
¡
¤
H if vj ∈ 12 , 1 .

That is, a bidder observes a signal that tells her if her opponent’s value is higher or lower than 1/2;
and this information structure is common knowledge.
In the equilibrium of the SPA for the auction environment described in Example 1, each bidder
will bid their own private valuation. In the FPA, however, we have to consider three cases: (i)
vi ∈ [0, 1/2] for i = 1, 2; (ii) vi ∈ (1/2, 1] for i = 1, 2; and (iii) vi ∈ [0, 1/2] and vj ∈ (1/2, 1] where
i 6= j. In case (i), both bidders eﬀectively compete in an auction environment in which it is common
knowledge that the valuations are both drawn from Uniform [0, 1/2] distributions. In case (ii), both

bidders eﬀectively compete in an auction environment in which it is common knowledge that the
valuations are both drawn from Uniform [1/2, 1] distributions. In case (iii), however, the bidders
are asymmetric in their valuation distributions and it is common knowledge. Clearly the FPA and
the SPA are revenue equivalent in case (i) and (ii) events. In case (iii) events, however, the bidder
asymmetry breaks the revenue equivalence. It can be easily verified that case (iii) events satisfy the
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conditions for a theorem of Maskin and Riley (2000a, Proposition 4.3) which shows that the FPA
would generate a higher expected revenue for the seller than the SPA under this type of asymmetry.
Thus, we reach the conclusion that overall in this example, the seller’s expected revenue is higher in
the FPA than that in the SPA. It can also be numerically verified that in case (iii) events, the FPA
may be allocatively ineﬃcient. Thus we have an example that the FPA generates higher expected
revenue for the seller than the SPA despite its possible allocative ineﬃciency relative to the SPA.

6.2

Information Acquisition

So far we have assumed that bidder’s information about her opponent’s valuation or valuation
distribution is provided by nature without incurring any cost. In reality, of course, such information
is be costly to acquire.7 Now we argue that if bidders have to costly acquire such information, then
diﬀerent auction mechanisms provide vastly diﬀerent incentives for such information acquisition.
This, together with the diﬀerence in revenue and allocative eﬃciency between the FPA and the SPA
we documented earlier, provides yet another reason for the auction designer to prefer one auction
mechanism over another even in private value auction environments.
In the SPA, bidders do not strategically use information about their opponents’ valuation, thus
there is no incentives at all to acquire such information if it is costly. This observation is completely
general for any private value auction environments. The lack of incentives to acquire information
about one’s opponents in the SPA is related to the fact that bidding one’s private valuation is an
ex post equilibrium in the SPA.
In the FPA, however, information about the opponent’s valuation does have strategic consequences in the bidding, thus bidders do have incentives to acquire such information if the cost is
suﬃciently small. We illustrate such incentives using an extension of Example 1 above. Suppose
that bidder i can, at a cost ci > 0, purchase a signal about her opponent’s valuation that reveals
whether her opponent’s valuation is below or above 1/2. Assume that a bidder’s signal purchase
decision is observable to her opponent. Suppose that the timing of the game is as follows: first,
bidders decide whether to purchase such a signal technology at cost ci ; second, nature draws private
valuations from Uniform [0, 1] for each bidder; third, a bidder observes whether her opponent’s private valuation is below or above 1/2 if and only if she purchased the signal technology; and finally,
bidders compete for the object in the FPA.
The equilibrium bidding strategies in the FPA depend on the signal purchase decisions:
7

Most of the existing literature in information acquisition in auctions are concerned with common value auctions

(for example, Matthews 1984, and Persico 2000).
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• If neither bidder purchased the signal technology in stage 1, then both bidders will play the
symmetric FPA in which the opponent’s valuation is drawn from Uniform [0, 1] distribution.
´
³R
1
Thus bidders bid v/2 and the expected surplus for each bidder is given by 0 v 2 dv /2 =

1/6 ≈ 0.16667.

• If both bidders purchase the signal technology, then bidder i0 s ex ante expected surplus from
the subsequent FPA is calculated as follows. (1). With probability 1/4, both bidder valuations

will be below 1/2. In this case, bidders will bid v/2 in equilibrium and the expected surplus
´
³R
1/2 2
for each bidder is 0 v dv /2 = 1/48. (2). With probability 1/4, both valuations will be

above 1/2. In this case, bidders will bid v/2 again in equilibrium and the expected surplus for
´
³R
1
each bidder is 1/2 v2 dv /2 = 7/48. (3). With probability 1/4, bidder i0 s valuation is below
1/2 and bidder j 0 s valuation is above 1/2, where j 6= i. (4). With probability 1/4, bidder i0 s

valuation is above 1/2 and bidder j 0 s valuation is below 1/2. The equilibria of the FPA in

the events of case (3) and (4) can not be analytically solved, but numerical calculation shows
that bidder i0 s expected surplus in case (3) and (4) are 0.01848 and 0.34808 respectively.8
Thus bidder i0 s ex ante expected surplus if both bidders purchased the signal technology is
1/48 + 7/48 + 0.01848 + 0.34808
≈ 0.13331.
4
• If bidder i does not purchases the signal technology but bidder j does, then bidder i and

j 0 s ex ante expected surplus from the subsequent FPA can be calculated as follows. (1).
With probability 1/2, bidder i0 s valuation is below 1/2. In this case, bidder i0 s belief about j 0 s
valuation is Uniform [0, 1] while bidder j 0 s belief about i0 s valuation is Uniform [0, 1/2] and this
is common knowledge. Hence, bidder i0 s expected surplus is that of a “weak” bidder (in the
terminology of Maskin and Riley 2000a) with Uniform [0, 1/2] valuation distribution against
a “strong” bidder with Uniform [0, 1] distribution in the FPA, which can be analytically
calculated to be approximately 0.0242334.9 Likewise, bidder j (the “strong” bidder in this
case)’s ex ante expected payoﬀ is approximately 0.253449. (2). With probability 1/2, bidder i0 s

8

John Riley and Estelle Cantillon graciously provided various versions of BIDCOMP2 fortran codes that are used

in calculating the bidders’ ex ante expected payoﬀs in the asymmetric auctions.
9

The unique equilibrium of a two-bidder asymmetric FPA with valuation distributions Uniform [0, h1 ] and Uniform

[0, h2 ] respectively where h1 > 0, h2 > 0 and h1 6= h2 are given by
√
√
1 + mv 2 − 1
1 − 1 − mv 2
,
b2 (v) =
b1 (v) =
mv
mv
¡ 2
¢
2
2
where m = h1 − h2 / (h1 h2 ) is a constant. Appendix B provides an elementary derivation of the above equilibrium.
See also Griesmer, Levitan and Shubik (1967) and Plum (1992).
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bidder iÂbidder j

No Purchase

No Purchase

0.16667,

Purchase

0.17878 − ci ,

0.166 67
0.12135

Purchase
0.12135,
0.13331 − ci ,

0.17878 − cj

0.13331 − cj

Table 1: The expected payoﬀ matrix.
valuation is above 1/2. In this case, bidder i0 s belief about bidder j 0 s valuation is Uniform [0, 1]
while bidder j 0 s belief about i0 s valuation is Uniform [1/2, 1] and this is common knowledge.
Hence, bidder i0 s expected surplus is that of a “strong” bidder with Uniform [1/2, 1] valuation
distribution against a “weak” bidder with Uniform [0, 1] distribution in the FPA, which can
be numerically calculated to be 0.218465. Likewise, bidder j (the “weak” bidder in this
case)’s expected surplus is approximately 0.104104. Thus bidder i (the non-purchaser)’s ex
ante expected payoﬀ is approximately
0.0242334 + 0.218465
= 0.12135;
2
and bidder j (the purchaser)’s ex ante expected payoﬀ is approximately
0.253449 + 0.104104
= 0.17878.
2
Table 1 lists the ex ante expected payoﬀ matrix for the two bidders taking into account the
information acquisition cost ci and cj . When ci and cj are suﬃciently small, the unique equilibrium
in the information acquisition stage is that both bidders purchase the signals. Both bidders are
made worse oﬀ through two channels. First, they incur the information acquisition cost; second,
in the subsequent FPA, they will be engaged in more fierce competition and the seller will be
able to extract a higher revenue. The social welfare is also decreased for two reasons. First, the
information acquisition cost is dissipative; second, the object will be allocated ineﬃciently with
positive probability.
This example also illustrates the possibility that a decrease in the cost of information acquisition
may increase allocative ineﬃciency in the first price auctions. Imagine that initially the information
acquisition cost ci are suﬃciently high that in equilibrium neither bidder purchases the signal
technology. Thus we know that the subsequent FPA is allocatively eﬃcient. However, as ci is
suﬃciently low, both bidders will purchase information in equilibrium and the subsequent FPA is
allocatively ineﬃcient with positive probability.
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7

Conclusion
This paper presents examples of two-bidder private value auctions in which each bidder observes

her own private valuation as well as noisy signals about her opponent’s private valuation. This departs from the one-dimensional symmetric IPV paradigm and relaxes the assumption that bidder’s
belief regarding her opponents is common knowledge. We partially characterize the equilibrium of
the FPA when each bidder’s signal about her opponent’s valuation is drawn from the same distribution, and show that the revenue-equivalence between standard auctions fails. Our examples
demonstrate that, first, the revenue ranking between the FPA and the SPA is ambiguous; second,
the equilibrium allocation of the object could be ineﬃcient in the FPA but is always eﬃcient in the
SPA, but the revenue and allocative eﬃciency may not coincide: an ineﬃcient FPA may generate
a higher expected revenue for the seller; but it is also possible that the seller’s expected revenue is
higher in the SPA even when the object is eﬃciently allocated in both auctions. We also show that
the equilibrium existence of the FPA may be problematic in multidimensional type environments.
Finally, we illustrate that diﬀerent auction mechanisms provide diﬀerent incentives for bidders to
acquire cost information about opponents’ private valuations. We also provide examples that the
allocative ineﬃciency in the FPA may increase as the signal becomes more informative; and the
allocative ineﬃciency may increase in the FPA as the information acquisition costs are decreased.
While the results in our paper are derived in examples, we have explained how the underlying
intuitions are general.
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Appendix A: Details of the Ineﬃcient Equilibrium.
In this appendix, we provide details of the ineﬃcient equilibrium in the proof of Proposition 4.
As described in the text, bidders with valuation Vl will bid Vl in pure strategy in any equilibrium.
In an ineﬃcient symmetric equilibrium, type-(Vm , L) bidder bids in mixed strategies on the support
(Vl , b̄(Vm ,L) ] according to CDF G(Vm ,L) , type-(Vh , L) bidder bids according to G(Vh ,L) on the support
£
¤
¤
£
b̄(Vm ,L) , b̄(Vh ,L) , type-(Vm , H) bidder bids according to G(Vm ,H) on the support b̄(Vh ,L) , b̄(Vm ,H) ,
£
¤
and finally type-(Vh , H) bidder bids according to G(Vh ,H) on the support b̄(Vm ,H) , b̄(Vh ,H) where
Vl < b̄(Vm ,L) < b̄(Vh ,L) < b̄(Vm ,H) < b̄(Vh ,H) .

A1. Deriving the Candidate Ineﬃcient Equilibrium Strategies.
We first derive the four CDFs and four thresholds from the bidders’ indiﬀerence conditions.
Suppose that bidder 2 plays according to the above prescribed strategies.

£
¤
Type-(Vm , L) bidder 1. Type-(Vm , L) bidder 1’s indiﬀerence condition on the support Vl , b̄(Vm ,L)
is:

Thus,

·

¸
pl ql
pm qm
pq
(Vm − b) P
+P
× qm G(Vm ,H) (b) = (Vm − Vl ) P l l .
pk qk
pk qk
pk qk
¶
µ
b − Vl
pl ql
G(Vm ,H) (b) =
,
2
pm qm
Vm − b
2 V
pl ql Vl + pm qm
m
.
b̄(Vm ,L) =
2
pl ql + pm qm

¤
£
Type-(Vh , L) bidder 1. Type-(Vh , L) bidder 1’s indiﬀerence condition on the support b̄(Vm ,L) , b̄(Vh ,L)
is:

·

Thus,

¸
pl ql
pm qm
ph qh
+P
qh + P
qh G(Vh ,L) (b)
(Vh − b) P
pk qk
pk qk
pk qk
¶
µ
¢
¡
pm qm
pl ql
= Vh − b̄(Vm ,L) P
+P
qh .
pk qk
pk qk
G(Vh ,L) (b) =
b̄(Vh ,L) =

pl ql + pm qm qh b − b̄(Vm ,L)
,
Vh − b
ph qh2

ph qh2 Vh + (pl ql + pm qm qh ) b̄(Vm ,L)
.
ph qh2 + pl ql + pm qm qh
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£
Type-(Vm , H) bidder 1. Type-(Vm , H) bidder 1’s indiﬀerence condition on the support b̄(Vh ,L) , b̄(Vm ,H)
is:

"

p (1 − ql )
pm (1 − qm ) qm ph (1 − qh ) qm
pm (1 − qm )2
(Vm − b) P l
+ P
+ P
+P
G
(b)
pk (1 − qk )
pk (1 − qk )
pk (1 − qk )
pk (1 − qk ) (Vm ,H)
·
¸
¢
¡
pl (1 − ql )
pm (1 − qm ) qm ph (1 − qh ) qm
P
P
P
= Vm − b̄(Vh ,L)
+
+
.
pk (1 − qk )
pk (1 − qk )
pk (1 − qk )

#

Thus,

G(Vm ,H) (b) =
b̄(Vm ,H) =

pl (1 − ql ) + pm (1 − qm ) qm + ph (1 − qh ) qm b − b̄(Vh ,L)
,
Vm − b
pm (1 − qm )2

[pl (1 − ql ) + pm (1 − qm ) qm + ph (1 − qh ) qm ] b̄(Vh ,L) + pm (1 − qm )2 Vm
pl (1 − ql ) + pm (1 − qm ) qm + ph (1 − qh ) qm + pm (1 − qm )2

.

¤
£
Type-(Vh , H) bidder 1. Type-(Vh , H) bidder 1’s indiﬀerence condition on the support b̄(Vm ,H) , b̄(Vh ,H)

is:

"

#
pl (1 − ql )
pm (1 − qm )
ph (1 − qh ) qh
ph (1 − qh )2
(Vh − b) P
+P
+P
+P
G
(b)
pk (1 − qk )
pk (1 − qk )
pk (1 − qk )
pk (1 − qk ) (Vh ,H)
¸
·
¡
¢
pm (1 − qm )
ph (1 − qh ) qh
pl (1 − ql )
+P
+P
.
= Vh − b̄(Vm ,H) P
pk (1 − qk )
pk (1 − qk )
pk (1 − qk )

Thus,

G(Vh ,H) (b) =
b̄(Vh ,H) =

·

¸
pl (1 − ql ) + pm (1 − qm ) + ph (1 − qh ) qh b − b̄(Vm ,H)
,
Vh − b
ph (1 − qh )2

ph (1 − qh )2 Vh + [pl (1 − ql ) + pm (1 − qm ) + ph (1 − qh ) qh ] b̄(Vm ,H)
ph (1 − qh )2 + pl (1 − ql ) + pm (1 − qm ) + ph (1 − qh ) qh

.

Clearly, we can obtain the corresponding expressions in the proof of Proposition 4 when we set
pl = pm = ph = 1/3.
A2. Deriving the Expected Surplus from Deviations.
Now we derive the expressions of diﬀerent types of bidders’ expected surplus from bids in
diﬀerent regions. In order to verify that the prescribed strategies indeed constitute an ineﬃcient
equilibrium, each bidder type’s expected surplus should be maximized in the support of its prescribe
strategy.
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Type-(Vm , L) bidder 1. Type-(Vm , L) bidder 1’s expected surplus from bid b, denoted by M(Vm ,L) ,
is:


¤
£

(Vm − Vl ) Pppl qklqk , if b ∈ Vl , b̄(Vm ,L)









¤
£
¤
£

Vm −b
2 +p q q G

P
if b ∈ b̄(Vm ,L) , b̄(Vh ,L)

q
+
p
q
(b)
,
p
m
m
l
l
h
h
(V
,L)
m

h
q
p
k k






£
Vm −b
2 +p q q
P
M(Vm ,L) (b) =
¤
£
pl ql + pm qm
h h m
p
q
k k


¤ if b ∈ b̄(Vh ,L) , b̄(Vm ,H)


+pm qm (1 − qm ) G(Vm ,H) (b) ,










Vm −b

P
¤
£


pk qk [pl ql + pm qm + ph qh qm

if b ∈ b̄(Vm ,H) , b̄(Vh ,H)
¤

 +p q (1 − q ) G
h h
h
(Vh ,H) (b) ,

Type-(Vh , L) bidder 1. Type-(Vh , L) bidder 1’s expected surplus from bid b, denoted by M(Vh ,L) ,
is:

M(Vh ,L) (b) =











































Vh −b
P
pk qk

£
¤
£
¤
pl ql + pm qm qh G(Vm ,L) (b) , if b ∈ Vl , b̄(Vm ,L)

Vh −b̄(Vm ,L)
P
pk qk

£
¤
(pl ql + pm qm qh ) , if b ∈ b̄(Vm ,L) , b̄(Vh ,L)

£
¤
£
pl ql + pm qm qh + ph qh2
¤ if b ∈ b̄(Vh ,L) , b̄(Vm ,H)
+pm qm (1 − qh ) G(Vm ,H) (b) ,
Vh −b
P
pk qk

£
¤
£
pl ql + pm qm + ph qh2
¤ if b ∈ b̄(Vm ,H) , b̄(Vh ,H)
+ph qh (1 − qh ) G(Vh ,H) (b) ,
Vh −b
P
pk qk

Type-(Vm , H) bidder 1. Type-(Vm , H) bidder 1’s expected surplus from bid b, denoted by M(Vm ,H) ,
is:

M(Vm ,H) (b) =











































P Vm −b
pk (1−qk )

¤
£
£
¤
pl (1 − ql ) + pm (1 − qm ) qm G(Vm ,L) (b) , if b ∈ Vl , b̄(Vm ,L)

P Vm −b
pk (1−qk )

¤
£
[pl (1 − ql ) + pm (1 − qm ) qm
if b ∈ b̄(Vm ,L) , b̄(Vh ,L)
¤
+ph (1 − qh ) qm G(Vh ,L) (b) ,

Vm −b̄(V ,L)
h
P
pk (1−qk )

¤
£
[pl (1 − ql ) + pm (1 − qm ) qm + ph (1 − qh ) qm ] , if b ∈ b̄(Vh ,L) , b̄(Vm ,H)

P Vm −b
pk (1−qk )

¤
£
[pl (1 − ql ) + pm (1 − qm ) + ph (1 − qh ) qm
if b ∈ b̄(Vm ,H) , b̄(Vh ,H)
¤
+ph (1 − qh ) (1 − qm ) G(Vh ,H) (b) ,
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Type-(Vh , H) bidder 1. Type-(Vh , H) bidder 1’s expected surplus from bid b, denoted by M(Vh ,H) ,
is:

M(Vh ,H) (b) =











































P Vh −b
pk (1−qk )

¤
£
¤
£
pl (1 − ql ) + pm (1 − qm ) qh G(Vm ,L) (b) , if b ∈ Vl , b̄(Vm ,L)

P Vh −b
pk (1−qk )

¤
£
[pl (1 − ql ) + pm (1 − qm ) qh
if b ∈ b̄(Vm ,L) , b̄(Vh ,L)
¤
+ph (1 − qh ) qh G(Vh ,L) (b) ,

P Vh −b
pk (1−qk )

¤
£
[pl (1 − ql ) + pm (1 − qm ) qh + ph (1 − qh ) qh
if b ∈ b̄(Vh ,L) , b̄(Vm ,H)
¤
+pm (1 − qm ) (1 − qh ) G(Vm ,H) (b) ,

Vh −b̄(Vm ,H)
P
pk (1−qk )

¤
£
[pl (1 − ql ) + pm (1 − qm ) + ph (1 − qh ) qh ] , if b ∈ b̄(Vm ,H) , b̄(Vh ,H) .

A3. The Graphs for the Example in the Proof of Proposition 4.
We collect the graphs for the example in the proof of Proposition 4, i.e., we let Vl = 0, Vm =
1, Vh = 2, and let pk = 1/3 for k ∈ {l, m, h} and ql = 0.9, qm = 0.1, qh = 0.05. The following graphs

show the expected surplus functions for the diﬀerent types of bidders to show that the candidate
ineﬃcient equilibrium derived in A1 indeed constitute an equilibrium.
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Figure 4: Type-(Vm , L) bidder’s expected surplus when bidding b ∈ Vl , b̄(Vh ,L) .
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Figure 5: Type-(Vm , L) bidder’s expected surplus when bidding b ∈ b̄(Vh ,L) , b̄(Vh ,H) .
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Figure 6: Type-(Vh , L) bidder’s expected surplus when bidding b ∈ Vl , b̄(Vh ,L) .
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Figure 7: Type-(Vh , L) bidder’s expected surplus when bidding b ∈ b̄(Vh ,L) , b̄(Vh ,H) .
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Figure 8: Type-(Vm , H) bidder’s expected surplus when bidding b ∈ Vl , b̄(Vh ,H) .
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Figure 9: Type-(Vh , H) bidder’s expected surplus when bidding b ∈ Vl , b̄(Vh ,H) .
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Appendix B.
In this appendix, we provide a detailed and elementary derivation of the equilibrium of the
asymmetric FPA auction discussed in footnote (9).
Suppose that bidder 1 and 20 s valuations are drawn independently from Uniform [0, h1 ] and
[0, h2 ] respectively where h1 6= h2 . Let bi : [0, hi ] → R+ be i0 s bidding function; and φi ≡ b−1
i
bidder i0 s inverse bid function. Given φ2 (·), bidder 1 with valuation v solves
max
b≥0

(v − b) φ2 (b)
.
h2

The first order condition is φ2 (b) = (v − b) φ02 (b) , i.e.,
φ02 (b) =

φ2 (b)
.
φ1 (b) − b

(25)

Similarly, bidder 2’s first order condition implies
φ01 (b) =

φ1 (b)
.
φ2 (b) − b

(26)

Consider the change-of-variable ki (b) ≡ φi (b) − b. We immediately have ki0 (b) = φ0i (b) − 1, which
can be used to rewrite the system of diﬀerential equations (25) and (26) as
£
¤
1 + k20 (b) k1 (b) = k2 (b) + b,
£
¤
1 + k10 (b) k2 (b) = k1 (b) + b.

(27)
(28)

Summing up the two equations, we obtain k20 (b) k1 (b)+k10 (b) k2 (b) = 2b. That is, d [k1 (b) k2 (b)] /db =
2b. Together with the initial condition that k1 (0) = k2 (0) = 0, we have
k1 (b) k2 (b) = b2 .
Substitute k2 (b) = b2 /k1 (b) into (28), we obtain
k10 (b) =

[k1 (b) + b] k1 (b)
− 1.
b2

(29)

This homogeneous diﬀerential equation can be solved as follows. Define u1 (b) ≡ k1 (b) /b. Hence
u01 (b) =

k1 (b) − bk10 (b)
.
b2

The diﬀerential equation (29) can be rewritten as the following separable diﬀerential equation:
u01 (b)
1
= ,
2
b
u1 (b) − 1
38

which as a unique solution
u1 (b) =
where m is a constant. Therefore,

and

1 + mb2
,
1 − mb2

¢
¡
b 1 + mb2
k1 (b) =
,
1 − mb2

¡
¢
b 1 − mb2
b2
=
.
k2 (b) =
k1 (b)
1 + mb2

Hence,
2b
,
1 − mb2
2b
.
φ2 (b) = k2 (b) + b =
1 + mb2
φ1 (b) = k1 (b) + b =

Solving for φ−1
i ≡ bi , we obtain

√
1 + mv 2 − 1
b1 (v) =
,
mv
√
1 − 1 − mv2
.
b2 (v) =
mv

To determine the constant m, we note that b1 (h1 ) = b2 (h2 ) in equilibrium (for an argument, see
Maskin and Riley 2000 for example). Solving for m from the equation
p
p
1 + mh21 − 1
1 − 1 − mh22
= b2 (h2 ) =
,
b1 (h1 ) =
mh1
mh22
we obtain a unique solution that
m=

h21 − h22
.
(h1 h2 )2
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